ARCH-COMP25 Category Report:
Artificial Intelligence and Neural Network Control Systems (AINNCS) for Continuous and Hybrid Systems Plants

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Abstract

This report presents the results of a friendly competition for formal verification of continuous and hybrid systems with artificial intelligence (AI) components. Specifically, machine learning (ML) components in cyber-physical systems (CPS), such as feedforward neural networks used as feedback controllers in closed-loop systems, are considered, which is a class of systems classically known as intelligent control systems, or in more modern and specific terms, neural network control systems (NNCS). We broadly refer to this category as AI and NNCS (AINNCS). The friendly competition took place as part of the workshop Applied Verification for Continuous and Hybrid Systems (ARCH) in 2025. In this edition of the AINNCS category at ARCH-COMP, five tools have been applied to solve 12 benchmarks, which are CORA, CROWN-Reach, immrax, JuliaReach, and NNV. For the second year in a row, we have the largest interest in the community, with four previous participants and one new participant, immrax. In reusing the hardware infrastructure and benchmarks from last year, we can observe comparable results from previous improvements, with slight improvements in computation time by CORA and NNV in selected benchmarks. A novelty of this year is the different problem abstraction between immrax and the rest of tools, leading to result disparities in 2 benchmarks: Single Pendulum and Attitude Control.

1   Introduction

Neural Networks (NNs) have demonstrated an impressive ability to solve complex problems in numerous application domains [81]. The success of these models in contexts such as adaptive control, non-linear system identification [59], image and pattern recognition, function approximation, and machine translation has stimulated the creation of technologies that are directly impacting our everyday lives [71], and has led researchers to believe that these models possess the power to revolutionize a diverse set of arenas [65].

Despite these achievements, there have been reservations about utilizing them within high-assurance systems for various reasons, such as their susceptibility to unexpected and errant behavior caused by slight perturbations in their inputs [45]. In a study by Szegedy et al. [72], the authors demonstrated that carefully applying a hardly perceptible modification to an input image could cause a successfully trained neural network to produce an incorrect classification. These inputs are known as *adversarial examples*, and their discovery has caused concern over the safety, reliability, and security of neural network applications [81]. As a result, some research has been directed toward obtaining an explicit understanding of neural network behavior.

Neural networks are often viewed as "black boxes" whose underlying operation is often incomprehensible. Still, the last several years have witnessed numerous promising white-box verification methods proposed for reasoning about the correctness of their behavior. However, it has been demonstrated that neural network verification is an NP-complete problem [40]. Despite many recent efforts and significant advances in the past decade [58, 76, 77, 78, 7, 23, 24, 41, 48, 70], there are remaining challenges that prevent these approaches from being successfully applied to very large neural networks used in many real-world applications such as [64]. Most of this work also focuses on verifying pre-/post-conditions for neural networks in isolation. Reasoning about their usage behavior in cyber-physical systems, such as in neural network control systems, remains a key challenge.

The following report aims to provide a survey of the landscape of the current capabilities of verification tools for *closed-loop systems with neural network controllers*, as these systems have displayed great utility as a means for learning control laws through techniques such as reinforcement learning and data-driven predictive control [19, 74]. Furthermore, this report aims to provide readers with a perspective on the intellectual progression of this rapidly growing field and stimulate the development of efficient and effective methods capable of use in real-life applications. Since the first iteration, there have been several publications investigating the formal verification of AINNCS, out of which several of them have participated in one or more of the previous competitions such as Verisig [34], VenMas [1] and ReachNN [22], among others [78, 15, 28, 2, 43, 21, 55, 19, 17, 33, 69].

Disclaimer   The presented report of the ARCH-COMP friendly competition for *closed-loop systems with neural network controllers*, termed in short AINNCS (Artificial Intelligence / Neural Network Control Systems), aims to provide the landscape of the current capabilities of verification tools for analyzing these systems that are classically known as *intelligent control systems*. This AINNCS ARCH-COMP category is complementary to the ongoing Verification of Neural Networks Competition (VNN-COMP) [9, 58], the latter of which focuses on open-loop specifications of neural networks. In contrast, the AINNCS category focuses on closed-loop behaviors of dynamical systems incorporating neural networks. We want to stress that each tool has unique strengths and not all of the specificities can be

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Specifically, this report summarizes results obtained in the 2025 friendly competition of the ARCH workshop[1] for verifying systems of the form

$$\dot{x}(t) = f(x(t), u(x, t)),$$

where $x(t)$ and $u(x, t)$ correspond to the states and inputs of the plant at time t, respectively, and where $u(x, t)$ is the output of a feedforward neural network provided an input of the plant state x at time t. The architecture of the closed-loop systems we consider is depicted in Figure 1, where the input to the neural network controller is additionally sampled.

## Continuous-Time Sampled-Data System Model

Figure 1: Closed-loop architecture of the benchmarks to be verified.

This year is the seventh iteration of the AINNCS category at ARCH-COMP and builds on the previous iterations and reports [53, 38, 37, 50, 51, 49]. Participating tools are summarized in Sec. 2. See [81] for further details on these and additional tools. The results of our selected benchmark problems are shown in Sec. 3. Similar to last year, we run all tools on the same hardware using docker images for further comparison. The docker images allow an automatic evaluation of the tools on the submission server, thus, giving researchers immediate feedback on the results of their submission. The submission server specifications are given in Appendix A.

The goal of the friendly competition is not to rank the results but rather to present the landscape of existing solutions in a breadth that is impossible with scientific publications in classical venues. Such publications would typically require the presentation of novel techniques, while this report showcases the current state-of-the-art tools. The selection of the benchmarks has been conducted within the forum of the ARCH website (cps-vo.org/group/ARCH), which is visible for registered users, and registration is open for anyone.

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[1]Workshop on Applied Verification for Continuous and Hybrid Systems (ARCH), cps-vo.org/group/ARCH

2   Participating Tools

We present a brief overview of all the participating tools in this friendly competition. The tools are *CORA*, *CROWN-Reach*, *JuliaReach*, and *NNV*, and first-time participant *immrax*. The tools participating in the *Artificial Intelligence / Neural Network Control Systems in Continuous and Hybrid Systems Plants* (AINNCS) category are introduced subsequently in alphabetical order.

CORA   *(Tobias Ladner, Matthias Althoff)*. CORA [2] is a COntinuous Reachability Analyzer for the formal verification of cyber-physical systems using reachability analysis. It is written in MATLAB and is available at https://cora.in.tum.de. CORA integrates various set representations and operations on them, as well as reachability algorithms of various dynamic system classes. For this competition, we used the approach described in [43, 47] for open-loop and closed-loop neural network verification based on polynomial zonotopes [42]. Polynomial zonotopes are particularly well suited for verifying neural networks due to their polynomial time complexity for many operations. CORA realizes a fast layer-based computation of an outer approximation of the output set of networks with various activation functions, including ReLU, sigmoid, and tanh [43], and can automatically refine the neuron abstractions in neural networks to obtain tighter enclosures [47]. Our neural network verification approaches are naturally integrated into our reachability analysis methods for linear and nonlinear plant dynamics. For most benchmarks, we can deploy a fully automatic verification process using CORA: We first simulate random runs to find potential violations of the specifications. If one run violates the specifications, we verify the violating run using reachability analysis, as simulations are not sound. Otherwise, we try to verify the benchmark for the given specifications.

CROWN-Reach   *(Xiangru Zhong, Huan Zhang)*. CROWN-Reach is a new open-source tool for reachability analysis of neural network control systems developed at UIUC. It aims to strengthen and extend the successful α,β-CROWN neural network verifier [83, 79, 84, 67] to the setting of neural network controller verification. CROWN-Reach consists of four main components: bound-propagation for efficient analysis of neural network controllers, Taylor model for plant analysis, branch-and-bound to refine the reachable set, and a sampling-based falsifier. For the analysis of neural network controllers, we use linear relaxation based perturbation analysis (LiRPA) methods such as CROWN [85] and α-CROWN [83] with extensions to cooperate with Taylor Model flowpipe computation. Our tool is based on the auto_LiRPA library[82], which can automatically compute linear functional over-approximations for neural networks with various activation functions, including ReLU, tanh, and sigmoid, as well as neural networks with general architectures (e.g., residual blocks and custom operators). We use the Flow*[16] library for analyzing the plant with continuous dynamics using Taylor models, and these Taylor models are symbolically combined with the linear bounds from CROWN to form the reachable set of the entire system. The branch-and-bound refinement process splits the input state space and utilizes parallelization (including both GPU and CPU) to achieve quick and precise analysis. The bound propagation process can be accelerated on GPUs and can scale to very large networks, while the computation of Taylor models is executed on CPUs using multi-threading. A paper describing the algorithm details of CROWN-Reach is currently being prepared. Code is available at https://github.com/Verified-Intelligence/CROWN-Reach.

immrax   *(Akash Harapanahalli, Samuel Coogan).* immrax [31] is an open-source tool originally designed for interval analysis and mixed monotone reachability. The entire pipeline is implemented in JAX, allowing for just-in-time compilation, easy scalability onto a GPU for parallel processing, and automatic differentiability through the entire framework to train neural networks with specific robustness guarantees in closed-loop [29]. immrax embeds neural network control systems into an embedding system, where a single trajectory provides an overapproximating reachable set of the system. For this competition, we use two different algorithms. The first uses interval analysis techniques combined with the efficient linear bound propagator CROWN [85] for fast interval reachability [35]. The second is a new method for propagating polytopes in H-rep, using CROWN [85] under the `same-slope` setting and the linearization of the system around a center trajectory to build an adjoint parametric embedding system [30]. In its current form, immrax only supports continuous feedback with the neural network controller, meaning for each benchmark, we interpret them without the sample-and-hold. The code and details are available at https://github.com/gtfactslab/immrax.

JuliaReach   *(Luis Benet, Marcelo Forets, Christian Schilling).* JuliaReach [15] is an open-source software suite for reachability computations of dynamical systems, written in the Julia language and available at http://github.com/JuliaReach. The package ClosedLoopReachability.jl handles the closed-loop analysis and queries sub-problems to our other libraries ReachabilityAnalysis.jl for continuous-time analysis of plant models and NeuralNetworkReachability.jl for set propagation through neural networks (both forward and backward [27]). Additional set computations are performed with LazySets.jl [26]. The algorithm we use is described in [66]. For the plant analysis, we use the sound algorithm `TMJets` based on interval arithmetic and Taylor models; this algorithm is implemented in TaylorModels.jl [11, 14], which itself incorporates TaylorSeries.jl [12, 13] and TaylorIntegration.jl [60]. The algorithm uses a jet transportation of a Taylor polynomial with interval coefficients. It has the following main parameters for tweaking: the absolute tolerance `abstol` and two parameters to define the order at which the Taylor expansion is cut in time (`orderT`) resp. in space (`orderQ`). For the neural-network analysis, we use an abstract interpretation based on zonotopes [70]. For falsification, we choose an initial point but then use set-based analysis for validated simulations.

NNV   *(Diego Manzanas Lopez, Taylor Johnson).* The Neural Network Verification (NNV) Tool [78, 52] is a formal verification software tool for deep learning models and cyber-physical systems with neural network components written in MATLAB and available at https://github.com/verivital/nnv. NNV uses a star-set state-space representation and reachability algorithm that allows for a layer-by-layer computation of exact or overapproximate reachable sets for feed-forward [76], convolutional [73], semantic segmentation (SSNN) [77], and recurrent (RNN)[75] neural networks, as well as neural network control systems (NNCS) [74, 78] and neural ordinary differential equations (Neural ODEs) [56]. The star-set based algorithm is naturally parallelizable, which allows NNV to be designed to perform efficiently on multi-core platforms. Additionally, if a particular safety property is violated, NNV can be used to construct and visualize the complete set of counterexample inputs for a neural network (exact-analysis). Using NNV in combination with HyST [8, 6] and CORA [2, 3, 4] allows for the verification of closed-loop neural network control systems with nonlinear plant dynamics.

3   Benchmarks

We have selected 12 benchmarks for this year's competition – the selected benchmarks are the same as last year's competition. We now describe these benchmarks in no particular order and have made them readily available online.[2] All benchmarks are derived for continuous time. Given the continuous dynamics $\dot{x} = f(x)$, where $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is the state vector, the discrete-time versions for a time increment of Δt are obtained in this competition using forward Euler integration:

$$x(k+1) = x(k) + f(x)\Delta t.$$

3.1   Adaptive Cruise Controller (ACC)

The Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) benchmark is a system that tracks a set velocity and maintains a safe distance from a lead vehicle by adjusting the longitudinal acceleration of an ego vehicle [57]. The neural network computes optimal control actions while satisfying safe distance, velocity, and acceleration constraints using model predictive control (MPC) [62]. For this case study, the ego car is set to travel at a set speed $v_{set} = 30$ and maintains a safe distance D_{safe} from the lead car. The car's dynamics are described by the following equations [74, p. 17]:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\dot{x}_{\mathrm{lead}}(t) &= v_{\mathrm{lead}}(t), \dot{v}_{\mathrm{lead}}(t) = a_{\mathrm{lead}}(t), \dot{a}_{\mathrm{lead}}(t) = -2a_{\mathrm{lead}}(t) + 2a_{c,\mathrm{lead}} - uv_{\mathrm{lead}}^2(t), \\
\dot{x}_{\mathrm{ego}}(t) &= v_{\mathrm{ego}}(t), \dot{v}_{\mathrm{ego}}(t) = a_{\mathrm{ego}}(t), \dot{a}_{\mathrm{ego}}(t) = -2a_{\mathrm{ego}}(t) + 2a_{c,\mathrm{ego}} - uv_{\mathrm{ego}}^2(t),
\end{aligned}
\tag{1}
$$

where x_i is the position, v_i is the velocity, a_i is the acceleration of the car, $a_{c,i}$ is the acceleration control input applied to the car, and $u = 0.0001$ is a coefficient for air drag, where $i \in \{\mathrm{ego},$ lead$\}$. We evaluate a neural network controller with five layers and 20 neurons each for this benchmark. The inputs of the controller are the set speed v_{set}, the desired time gap T_{gap}, the ego velocity v_{ego}, the distance $D_{\mathrm{rel}} = x_{\mathrm{lead}} - x_{\mathrm{ego}}$, as well as the relative velocity v_{rel}, and the output is $a_{\mathrm{c,ego}}$.

Specifications   The verification objective of this system is that given a scenario where both cars are driving safely, the lead car suddenly slows down with $a_{c,\mathrm{lead}} = $ -2. We want to check whether there is a collision in the following 5 s. Formally, this safety specification of the system can be expressed as $D_{\mathrm{rel}} \geq D_{\mathrm{safe}}$, where $D_{\mathrm{safe}} = D_{\mathrm{default}} + T_{\mathrm{gap}} \cdot v_{\mathrm{ego}}$, and $T_{\mathrm{gap}} = 1.4$ s and $D_{\mathrm{default}} = 10$. The initial conditions are: $x_{\mathrm{lead}}(0) \in [90,110]$, $v_{\mathrm{lead}}(0) \in [32,32.2]$, $a_{\mathrm{lead}}(0) = a_{\mathrm{ego}}(0) = 0$, $v_{\mathrm{ego}}(0) \in [30, 30.2]$, $x_{\mathrm{ego}} \in [10,11]$. A control period of 0.1 s is used.

3.2   TORA

This benchmark considers translational oscillations by a rotational actuator (TORA) [19, 36], where a cart is attached to a wall with a spring and is free to move on a frictionless surface. The cart has a weight attached to an arm inside it, which is free to rotate about an axis. This serves as the control input to stabilize the cart at $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$. The model is a four-dimensional system, given by the following equations [36, eq. (4)]:

$$\dot{x_1} = x_2, \quad \dot{x_2} = -x_1 + 0.1\sin(x_3), \quad \dot{x_3} = x_4, \quad \dot{x_4} = u. \tag{2}$$

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[2]GitHub repository of benchmarks: `https://github.com/verivital/ARCH-COMP2025`

This benchmark has three neural network controllers: the first has three ReLU hidden layers and a linear output layer. This controller was trained using a data-driven model predictive controller proposed in [20]. Note that the output of the neural network $f(\mathbf{x})$ needs to be normalized to obtain u, namely $u = f(\mathbf{x}) - 10$. The sampling time for this controller is 1 s, and we verify it against specification 1 below. The other two controllers have three hidden layers of 20 neurons each and one output layer. In contrast to the first controller, we use sigmoid activation functions for the hidden layers and a tanh output layer. The sampling time of these controllers is 0.5 s, the output of the neural network $f(\mathbf{x})$ needs to be post-processed as $u = 11 \cdot f(\mathbf{x})$, and we verify them against specification 2 below.

Specification 1. This is a safety specification. For an initial set of $x_1 \in [0.6, 0.7]$, $x_2 \in [-0.7, -0.6]$, $x_3 \in [-0.4, -0.3]$, and $x_4 \in [0.5, 0.6]$, the system states have to stay within the box $\mathbf{x} \in [-2, 2]^4$ for a time window of 20 s.

Specification 2. For an initial set of $x_1 \in [-0.77, -0.75]$, $x_2 \in [-0.45, -0.43]$, $x_3 \in [0.51, 0.54]$, and $x_4 \in [-0.3, -0.28]$, it is required that the system reaches the set $x_1 \in [-0.1, 0.2]$, $x_2 \in [-0.9, -0.6]$ within a time window of 5 s.

3.3 Unicycle

This benchmark considers a unicycle model of a car [19] with the x and y coordinates on a two-dimensional plane, the velocity magnitude (speed), and steering angle as state variables. The dynamic equations are (see [5, Sec. III.B]; a different input is used here):

$$\dot{x}_1 = x_4 \cos(x_3), \quad \dot{x}_2 = x_4 \sin(x_3), \quad \dot{x}_3 = u_2, \quad \dot{x}_4 = u_1 + w, \tag{3}$$

where w is a bounded error in the range $10^{-4}[-1, 1]$. A neural network controller was trained for this system using a model predictive controller as a "demonstrator" or "teacher". The trained network has one hidden layer with 500 neurons. Note that the output of the neural network $f(\mathbf{x})$ needs to be normalized in order to obtain (u_1, u_2), namely $u_i = f(\mathbf{x})_i - 20$. The sampling time for this controller is 0.2 s.

Specification This is a reachability specification. For an initial set of $x_1 \in [9.5, 9.55]$, $x_2 \in [-4.5, -4.45]$, $x_3 \in [2.1, 2.11]$, and $x_4 \in [1.5, 1.51]$, the system has to reach the set $x_1 \in [-0.6, 0.6], x_2 \in [-0.2, 0.2], x_3 \in [-0.06, 0.06], x_4 \in [-0.3, 0.3]$ within a time window of 10 s.

3.4 VerticalCAS

This benchmark is a closed-loop variant of the *aircraft collision avoidance system ACAS X*. The scenario involves two aircraft, the ownship and the intruder, where the ownship is equipped with a collision avoidance system referred to as VerticalCAS [39]. VerticalCAS issues vertical climb rate advisories every second to the ownship pilot to avoid a near mid-air collision (NMAC). Near mid-air collisions are regions where the ownship and the intruder are separated by less than 100ft vertically and 500ft horizontally. The ownship (black) is assumed to have a constant horizontal speed, and the intruder (red) is assumed to follow a constant horizontal trajectory towards ownship, see Figure 2. The current geometry of the system is described by

- h, intruder altitude relative to ownship,
- $\dot{h}_0$, ownship vertical climb rate, and

Figure 2: VerticalCAS encounter geometry

- τ, the time until the ownship (black) and intruder (red) are no longer horizontally separated.

We can, therefore, assume that the intruder is static and the horizontal separation τ decreases by one each second. There are nine advisories, and each of them instructs the pilot to accelerate until the vertical climb rate of the ownship complies with the advisory:

1. COC: Clear Of Conflict;

2. DNC: Do Not Climb;

3. DND: Do Not Descend;

4. DES1500: Descend at least 1500 ft/s;

5. CL1500: Climb at least 1500 ft/s;

6. SDES1500: Strengthen Descent to at least 1500 ft/s;

7. SCL1500: Strengthen Climb to at least 1500 ft/s;

8. SDES2500: Strengthen Descent to at least 2500 ft/s;

9. SCL2500: Strengthen Climb to at least 2500 ft/s.

In addition to the parameters describing the geometry of the encounter, the current state of the system stores the advisory $adv \in \{1, \ldots, 9\}$ (numbers correspond to the above list) issued to the ownship at the previous time step. VerticalCAS is implemented as nine ReLU networks N_i, one for each (previous) advisory, with three inputs $(h, \dot{h}_0, \tau)$, five fully-connected hidden layers of 20 units each, and nine outputs representing the score of each possible advisory. Therefore, given a current state $(h, \dot{h}_0, \tau, adv)$, the new advisory adv' is obtained by computing the argmax of the output of N_{adv} on $(h, \dot{h}_0, \tau)$.

Given the new advisory, the pilot can choose acceleration $\ddot{h}_0$ as follows. If the new advisory is COC, then it can be any acceleration from the set $\{-\frac{g}{8}, 0, \frac{g}{8}\}$. For all remaining advisories, if the previous advisory coincides with the new one and the current climb rate complies with the new advisory (e.g., $\dot{h}_0$ is non-positive for DNC and $\dot{h}_0 \geq 1500$ for CL1500), the acceleration $\ddot{h}_0$ is 0; otherwise, the pilot can choose any acceleration $\ddot{h}_0$ from the given sets:

- DNC: $\{-\frac{g}{3}, -\frac{7g}{24}, -\frac{g}{4}\}$;

- DND: $\{\frac{g}{4}, \frac{7g}{24}, \frac{g}{3}\}$;

- DES1500: $\{-\frac{g}{3}, -\frac{7g}{24}, -\frac{g}{4}\}$;

- CL1500: $\{\frac{g}{4}, \frac{7g}{24}, \frac{g}{3}\}$;

- SDES1500: $\{-\frac{g}{3}\}$;

- SCL1500: $\{\frac{g}{3}\}$;

- SDES2500: $\{-\frac{g}{3}\}$;

- SCL2500: $\{\frac{g}{3}\}$,

where g represents the gravitational constant 32.2 ft/s^2.

It was proposed to tweak the benchmark for the tools that cannot efficiently account for all possible acceleration choices. Those tools can consider two strategies for picking a single acceleration at each time step:

- a worst-case scenario selection, where we choose the acceleration to take the ownship closer to the intruder.

- always select the acceleration in the middle.

Given the current system state $(h, \dot{h}_0, \tau, \text{adv})$, the new advisory adv' and the acceleration $\ddot{h}_0$, the new state of the system can be computed by the following equations [39, eq. (15)]:

$$h(k + 1) = h(k) - \dot{h}_0(k)\Delta\tau - 0.5\ddot{h}_0(k)\Delta\tau^2$$
$$\dot{h}_0(k + 1) = \dot{h}_0(k) + \ddot{h}_0(k)\Delta\tau$$
$$\tau(k + 1) = \tau(k) + \Delta\tau$$
$$\text{adv}(k + 1) = \text{adv}'$$

where $\Delta\tau = 1$.

Specification   The ownship has to be outside of the NMAC zone after $k \in \{1, \ldots, 10\}$ time steps, i.e., $h(k) > 100$ or $h(k) < -100$, for all possible choices of acceleration by the pilot. The set of initial states considered is: $h(0) \in [-133, -129]$, $\dot{h}_0(0) \in \{-19.5, -22.5, -25.5, -28.5\}$, $\tau(0) = 25$ and $\text{adv}(0) = \text{COC}$.

3.5   Single Pendulum

We consider a classical inverted pendulum. A ball of mass m is attached to a massless beam of length L. The beam is actuated with a torque T, and we assume viscous friction with a friction coefficient of c. The governing equation of motion can be obtained as [54, eq. (1)]:

$$\ddot{\theta} = \frac{g}{L}\sin\theta + \frac{1}{mL^2}\left(T - c\,\dot{\theta}\right), \tag{4}$$

where θ is the angle of the link concerning the upward vertical axis and $\dot{\theta}$ is the angular velocity. After defining the state variables $x_1 = \theta$ and $x_2 = \dot{\theta}$, the dynamics in state-space form is

$$\dot{x}_1 = x_2, \tag{5a}$$

$$\dot{x}_2 = \frac{g}{L}\sin x_1 + \frac{1}{mL^2}\left(T - c\,x_2\right). \tag{5b}$$

Controllers are trained using *behavior cloning*, a supervised learning approach for training controllers. The code, as well as training procedures, are provided. The model parameters are chosen as

$$m = 0.5, L = 0.5, c = 0, g = 1, \tag{6}$$

and the time step for the controller and the discrete-time model is $\Delta t = 0.05$. The initial set is

$$x \in [1.0, 1.175] \times [0.0, 0.2].$$

Specification $\forall t \in [0.5, 1] : \theta \in [0, 1]$ (analogously for $k \in [10, 20]$ in discrete time).

3.6   Double Pendulum

The double pendulum is an inverted two-link pendulum with equal point masses m at the ends of connected massless links of length L. The links are actuated with torques T_1 and T_2, and we assume viscous friction exists with a coefficient of c. The governing equations of motion are described by the following equations [54, eq. (3a-b)]:

$$2\ddot{\theta}_1 + \ddot{\theta}_2 \cos(\theta_2 - \theta_1) - \dot{\theta}_2^2 \sin(\theta_2 - \theta_1) - 2\frac{g}{L}\sin\theta_1 + \frac{c}{mL^2}\dot{\theta}_1 = \frac{1}{mL^2}T_1, \tag{7a}$$

$$\ddot{\theta}_1 \cos(\theta_2 - \theta_1) + \ddot{\theta}_2 + \dot{\theta}_1^2 \sin(\theta_2 - \theta_1) - \frac{g}{L}\sin\theta_2 + \frac{c}{mL^2}\dot{\theta}_2 = \frac{1}{mL^2}T_2, \tag{7b}$$

where θ_1 and θ_2 are the angles of the links concerning the upward vertical axis (see Figure 3) and g is the gravitational acceleration. After defining the state vector as $x = [\theta_1, \theta_2, \dot{\theta}_1, \dot{\theta}_2]^T$, the dynamics in state-space form is

$$\dot{x}_1 = x_3, \tag{8a}$$

$$\dot{x}_2 = x_4, \tag{8b}$$

$$\dot{x}_3 = \frac{1}{2\left(\frac{\cos^2(x_1 - x_2)}{2} - 1\right)} \cos\left(x_1 - x_2\right)\left(x_3{}^2 \sin\left(x_1 - x_2\right) - \cos\left(x_1 - x_2\right)\left(\frac{g\,\sin\left(x_1\right)}{L}\right. \right. \tag{8c}$$

$$\left. \left. -\frac{x_4{}^2 \sin\left(x_1 - x_2\right)}{2} + \frac{T_1 - c\,x_3}{2\,L^2\,m}\right) + \frac{g\,\sin\left(x_2\right)}{L} + \frac{T_2 - c\,x_4}{L^2\,m}\right) \tag{8d}$$

$$-\frac{x_4{}^2 \sin\left(x_1 - x_2\right)}{2} + \frac{g\,\sin\left(x_1\right)}{L} + \frac{T_1 - c\,x_3}{2\,L^2\,m}, \tag{8e}$$

$$\dot{x}_4 = \frac{-1}{\frac{\cos^2(x_1 - x_2)}{2} - 1}\left(x_3{}^2 \sin\left(x_1 - x_2\right) - \cos\left(x_1 - x_2\right)\left(\frac{g\,\sin\left(x_1\right)}{L} - \frac{x_4{}^2 \sin\left(x_1 - x_2\right)}{2}\right.\right. \tag{8f}$$

$$\left.\left. +\frac{T_1 - c\,x_3}{2\,L^2\,m}\right) + \frac{g\,\sin\left(x_2\right)}{L} + \frac{T_2 - c\,x_4}{L^2\,m}\right). \tag{8g}$$

The controllers for the double pendulum benchmark are obtained using the same methods as the controllers for the single pendulum benchmark; the code, as well as training procedures, are provided. The model parameters are chosen as in (6) The initial set is

$$x \in [1.0, 1.3]^4.$$

Specification 1 $\forall t \in [0, 1] : x \in [-1.7, 2]^4$ (analogously for $k \in [0, 20]$ in discrete time) for $\Delta t = 0.05$.

Specification 2 $\forall t \in [0, 0.4] : x \in [-1.5, 1.5]^4$ (analogously for $k \in [0, 20]$ in discrete time) for $\Delta t = 0.02$.

We verify *controller double pendulum less robust* against specification 1 and *controller double pendulum more robust* against specification 2.

Figure 3: Inverted double pendulum. The goal is to keep the pendulum upright (dashed schematics)

3.7 Airplane

The airplane example consists of a dynamical system that is a simple model of a flying airplane as shown in Figure 4. The state is

$$x = [s_x, s_y, s_z, v_x, v_y, v_z, \phi, \theta, \psi, r, p, q]^T, \tag{9}$$

where (s_x, s_y, s_z) is the position of the center of gravity, (v_x, v_y, v_z) are the components of velocity in (x, y, z) directions, (p, q, r) are body rotation rates, and (ϕ, θ, ψ) are the Euler angles. The equations of motion are reduced to [54, eq. (7)]:

$$\dot{v}_x = -g \sin \theta + \frac{F_x}{m} - qv_z + rv_y, \tag{10a}$$

$$\dot{v}_y = g \cos \theta \sin \phi + \frac{F_y}{m} - rv_x + pv_z, \tag{10b}$$

$$\dot{v}_z = g \cos \theta \cos \phi + \frac{F_z}{m} - pv_y + qv_x, \tag{10c}$$

$$I_x \dot{p} + I_{xz} \dot{r} = M_x - (I_z - I_y)qr - I_{xz}pq, \tag{10d}$$

$$I_y \dot{q} = M_y - I_{xz} \left(r^2 - p^2 \right) - (I_x - I_z)pr, \tag{10e}$$

$$I_{xz} \dot{p} + I_z \dot{r} = M_z - (I_y - I_x)qp - I_{xz}rq. \tag{10f}$$

The mass of the airplane is denoted with m and I_x, I_y, I_z and I_{xz} are the moment of inertia with respect to the indicated axis; see Figure 4. The control parameters include three force components F_x, F_y and F_z and three moment components M_x, M_y, M_z. Note that for simplicity, we assume that the aerodynamic forces are absorbed in the force vector F. In addition to these six equations, we have six additional kinematic equations [54, eq. (8,9)]:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{s}_x \\ \dot{s}_y \\ \dot{s}_z \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \cos \psi & -\sin \psi & 0 \\ \sin \psi & \cos \psi & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \cos \theta & 0 & \sin \theta \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ -\sin \theta & 0 & \cos \theta \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \cos \phi & -\sin \phi \\ 0 & \sin \phi & \cos \phi \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_x \\ v_y \\ v_z \end{bmatrix} \tag{11}$$

Figure 4: The airplane example.

and

$$\begin{bmatrix} \phi \\ \theta \\ \psi \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \tan\theta\sin\phi & \tan\theta\cos\phi \\ 0 & \cos\phi & -\sin\phi \\ 0 & \sec\theta\sin\phi & \sec\theta\cos\phi \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} p \\ q \\ r \end{bmatrix}. \tag{12}$$

As in the pendulum benchmarks, controllers are trained for the airplane problem using behavior cloning. The system involves the model parameters

$$m = 1, I_x = I_y = I_z = 1, I_{xz} = 0, g = 1,$$

and the time step for the controller and the discrete-time model is $\Delta t = 0.1$. The initial set is

$$x = y = z = r = p = q = 0, \quad [v_x, v_y, v_z, \phi, \theta, \psi] \in [0.0, 1.0]^6.$$

Specification $\forall t \in [0, 2] : s_y \in [-1, 1]$, $[\phi, \theta, \psi] \in [-1.0, 1.0]^3$. Analogously for $k \in [0, 20]$ in discrete time.

We verify the airplane controller against the specification above.

3.8   Attitude Control

We consider the attitude control of a rigid body with six states and three inputs [61, 68]. The system dynamics is given by [61, Sec. V]:

$$\dot{\omega}_1 = 0.25(u_0 + \omega_2\omega_3), \qquad \dot{\omega}_2 = 0.5(u_1 - 3\omega_1\omega_3), \qquad \dot{\omega}_3 = u_2 + 2\omega_1\omega_2,$$
$$\dot{\psi}_1 = 0.5\left(\omega_2(\psi_1^2+\psi_2^2+\psi_3^2-\psi_3)+\omega_3(\psi_1^2+\psi_2^2+\psi_2+\psi_3^2)+\omega_1(\psi_1^2+\psi_2^2+\psi_3^2+1)\right),$$
$$\dot{\psi}_2 = 0.5\left(\omega_1(\psi_1^2+\psi_2^2+\psi_3^2+\psi_3)+\omega_3(\psi_1^2-\psi_1+\psi_2^2+\psi_3^2)+\omega_2(\psi_1^2+\psi_2^2+\psi_3^2+1)\right),$$
$$\dot{\psi}_3 = 0.5\left(\omega_1(\psi_1^2+\psi_2^2-\psi_2+\psi_3^2)+\omega_2(\psi_1^2+\psi_1+\psi_2^2+\psi_3^2)+\omega_3(\psi_1^2+\psi_2^2+\psi_3^2+1)\right),$$

wherein the state $x = (\omega^T, \psi^T)^T$ consists of the angular velocity vector in a body-fixed frame $\omega \in \mathbb{R}^3$ and the Rodrigues parameter vector $\psi \in \mathbb{R}^3$.

The control torque $u \in \mathbb{R}^3$ is updated every 0.1 s by a neural network with three hidden layers, each of which has 64 neurons. The activations of the hidden layers are sigmoid and identity, respectively. We train the neural-network controller using supervised learning methods to learn from a known nonlinear controller [61]. The initial state set is:

$$\omega_1 \in [-0.45, -0.44], \omega_2 \in [-0.55, -0.54], \omega_3 \in [0.65, 0.66],$$
$$\psi_1 \in [-0.75, -0.74], \psi_2 \in [0.85, 0.86], \psi_3 \in [-0.65, -0.64].$$

Specification   The system should not reach the following unsafe set in 3 s (30 time steps):

$$\omega_1 \in [-0.2, 0], \omega_2 \in [-0.5, -0.4], \omega_3 \in [0, 0.2],$$
$$\psi_1 \in [-0.7, -0.6], \psi_2 \in [0.7, 0.8], \psi_3 \in [-0.4, -0.2].$$

We want to show that the above specification does not hold.

3.9   Quadrotor

This benchmark studies a neural-network controlled quadrotor (QUAD) with twelve state variables [10]. We have the inertial (north) position x_1, the inertial (east) position x_2, the altitude x_3, the longitudinal velocity x_4, the lateral velocity x_5, the vertical velocity x_6, the roll angle x_7, the pitch angle x_8, the yaw angle x_9, the roll rate x_{10}, the pitch rate x_{11}, and the yaw rate x_{12}. The control torque $u \in \mathbb{R}^3$ is updated every 0.1 s by a neural network with 3 hidden layers, each of which has 64 neurons. The activations of the hidden layers and the output layer are sigmoid and identity, respectively. The dynamics are given by the following equations [10, eq. (12-16)]:

$$\dot{x}_1 = \cos(x_8)\cos(x_9)x_4 + (\sin(x_7)\sin(x_8)\cos(x_9) - \cos(x_7)\sin(x_9))\,x_5$$
$$+ (\cos(x_7)\sin(x_8)\cos(x_9) + \sin(x_7)\sin(x_9))\,x_6,$$
$$\dot{x}_2 = \cos(x_8)\sin(x_9)x_4 + (\sin(x_7)\sin(x_8)\sin(x_9) + \cos(x_7)\cos(x_9))\,x_5$$
$$+ (\cos(x_7)\sin(x_8)\sin(x_9) - \sin(x_7)\cos(x_9))\,x_6,$$
$$\dot{x}_3 = \sin(x_8)x_4 - \sin(x_7)\cos(x_8)x_5 - \cos(x_7)\cos(x_8)x_6,$$
$$\dot{x}_4 = x_{12}x_5 - x_{11}x_6 - g\sin(x_8,)$$
$$\dot{x}_5 = x_{10}x_6 - x_{12}x_4 + g\cos(x_8)\sin(x_7),$$
$$\dot{x}_6 = x_{11}x_4 - x_{10}x_5 + g\cos(x_8)\cos(x_7) - g - u_1/m,$$
$$\dot{x}_7 = x_{10} + \sin(x_7)\tan(x_8)x_{11} + \cos(x_7)\tan(x_8)x_{12},$$
$$\dot{x}_8 = \cos(x_7)x_{11} - \sin(x_7)x_{12},$$
$$\dot{x}_9 = \frac{\sin(x_7)}{\cos(x_8)}x_{11} - \frac{\cos(x_7)}{\cos(x_8)}x_{12},$$
$$\dot{x}_{10} = \frac{J_y - J_z}{J_x}x_{11}x_{12} + \frac{1}{J_x}u_2,$$
$$\dot{x}_{11} = \frac{J_z - J_x}{J_y}x_{10}x_{12} + \frac{1}{J_y}u_3,$$
$$\dot{x}_{12} = \frac{J_x - J_y}{J_z}x_{10}x_{11} + \frac{1}{J_z}\tau_\psi,$$

where

$$g = 9.81, \quad m = 1.4, \quad J_x = 0.054,$$
$$J_y = 0.054, \quad J_z = 0.104, \quad \tau_\psi = 0.$$

The initial set is:

$$x_1 \in [-0.4, 0.4], x_2 \in [-0.4, 0.4], x_3 \in [-0.4, 0.4], x_4 \in [-0.4, 0.4],$$
$$x_5 \in [-0.4, 0.4], x_6 \in [-0.4, 0.4], x_7 = 0, x_8 = 0, x_9 = 0, x_{10} = 0, x_{11} = 0, x_{12} = 0.$$

Specification   The control goal is to stabilize the attitude x_3 to a goal region $[0.94, 1.06]$ and remain within these bounds with a time horizon of 5 s (50 time steps).

3.10   2D Spacecraft Docking

In the 2D spacecraft docking environment, the state of an active deputy spacecraft is expressed relative to the passive chief spacecraft in Hill's reference frame [32]. The dynamics are given by a first-order approximation of the relative motion dynamics between the deputy and chief spacecraft, which is given by Clohessy-Wiltshire [18] equations [63, eq. (12)],

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{s}_x \\ \dot{s}_y \\ \ddot{s}_x \\ \ddot{s}_y \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 3n^2 & 0 & 0 & 2n \\ 0 & 0 & -2n & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} s_x \\ s_y \\ \dot{s}_x \\ \dot{s}_y \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ \frac{1}{m} & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{1}{m} \end{bmatrix} u, \tag{13}$$

where $m = 12$ (kg), $n = 0.001027$ (rad/s), and $u \in \mathbb{R}^2$.

The neural network controller was trained on the Docking 2D environment with reinforcement learning using the training procedure described in [63]. However, the training procedure differed in providing only the full state (position and velocity) as input and with hard clipping of output actions replaced with soft tanh clipping. The neural network architecture was a shallow multilayer perceptron with 2 hidden layers of 256 neurons and tanh activation functions, and a linear output layer. The pre-processing and post-processing of the controller have been incorporated into the model as linear layers. The controller was trained with a sampling time of 1 s.

Specification   The spacecraft should satisfy the following safety constraints for 40 s:

$$(\dot{s}_x^2 + \dot{s}_y^2)^{\frac{1}{2}} \leq 0.2 + 2n(s_x^2 + s_y^2)^{\frac{1}{2}}, \tag{14}$$

given the initial set is

$$s_x \in [70, 106], s_y \in [70, 106], \dot{s}_x \in [-0.28, 0.28], \dot{s}_y \in [-0.28, 0.28].$$

3.11   Navigation Task

The navigation benchmark models a simplified model of a robot [19] navigating to a goal region while avoiding an obstacle along its path. The state is four-dimensional consisting of the horizontal and vertical position x, y, the angle θ of the robot, and velocity ν. The controller gets all states as input and has an output $u \in [-1, 1]^2$. The dynamics of the system are given by:

$$\dot{s} = \begin{bmatrix} \nu \cos \theta \\ \nu \sin \theta \\ u_{(1)} \\ u_{(2)} \end{bmatrix}. \tag{15}$$

This benchmark is designed to compare how different training schemes improve the verifiability of a controller. As a baseline, the first controller was trained using standard (point-based) reinforcement learning. We used adversarial training to obtain a second, more robust controller: During training, uncertainties of a given state are modeled using sets, and the weights are updated based on the entire input set rather than individual points. This approach was first developed in the supervised learning setting [44], and has also been applied during reinforcement learning [80]. Both networks have two hidden layers with 64 neurons each and ReLU activation, with a final layer with tanh activation to match the benchmark description. The controllers were trained with a sampling time of 0.2 s.

Specification   The robot should avoid an obstacle during the entire time horizon ($t \in [0, 6]$s) and reach the goal region at $t = 6$s. The initial set is given by:

$$x \in [2.9, 3.1], \ y \in [2.9, 3.1], \ \theta \in [0, 0], \ \nu \in [0, 0].$$

The obstacle is located at:

$$x \in [1, 2], \ y \in [1, 2], \ \theta \in [-\infty, \infty], \ \nu \in [-\infty, \infty].$$

The goal region is located at:

$$x \in [-0.5, 0.5], \ y \in [-0.5, 0.5], \ \theta \in [-\infty, \infty], \ \nu \in [-\infty, \infty].$$

3.12   CartPole

We consider an inverted pendulum (pole) mounted on a movable one-directional cart. The controller's goal is to balance the pendulum upright by moving the cart. The pole of length l_p has a total mass m_p. The cart's responsiveness is defined by its acceleration magnitude x_{acc}. By using cartpole equations [25] and the momentum inertia defined by $I = \frac{3}{4} m_p l^2$ we get a physical description of the system. With $x_1 \in [-0.5, 0.5]$ being the carts position (with its velocity $x_2 = \dot{x}_1$) and $x_3 \in \mathbb{R}$ being the angle of the pendulum (with $\{2\pi z, z \in \mathbb{Z}\}$ being the inverted state, $x_4 = \dot{x}_3$ the angular velocity) the state vector is defined by $[x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4]^T$. This results into the following behaviour.

$$\dot{x}_1 = x_2 \tag{16}$$
$$\dot{x}_2 = x_{acc} \cdot f(x_1, x_2, \sin x_3, \cos x_3, x_4) \tag{17}$$
$$\dot{x}_3 = x_4 \tag{18}$$
$$\dot{x}_4 = \frac{m_p \cdot l_p \cdot (g \cdot \sin x_3 - x_{acc} \cdot f(x_1, x_2, \sin x_3, \cos x_3, x_4) \cdot \cos x_3) - \mu_p \cdot x_4}{I} \tag{19}$$

with $f(x_1, x_2, \sin x_3, \cos x_3, x_4)$ being the output of the controller.
The system parameters are given by

$$l_p = 0.41 \, m, \quad m_p = 0.08 \, kg, \quad I = 10.5 \cdot 10^{-3} \, kg \, m^2,$$

$$x_{acc} = 2 \, \frac{m}{s^2}, \quad \mu_p = 2.1 \cdot 10^{-3} \, \frac{kg \, m^2}{s^2}, \quad g = 9.8 \, \frac{m}{s^1}$$

The initial set is defined by

$$(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) \in [-0.1, 0.1] \times [-0.05, 0.05] \times [-0.1, 0.1] \times [-0.05, 0.05]$$

The controller has a latency of $\tau = 0.02 \, s$.

Specification   After a settling time of 8 seconds the controller is able to stabilize the pendulum $((x_3, x_4 \in [-0.001, 0.001]^2))$ in the middle of the rail ($x_1 \in [-0.001, 0.001]$):

$$\forall t \in [8 \, s, 10 \, s] : \quad x_1, x_3, x_4 \in [-0.001, 0.001]^3$$

4   Verification Results

For each of the participating tools, we obtained verification results for some or all of the benchmarks. This year's competition (as in the previous 2 years) included the submission of the tools for repeatability prior to the writing of the report to ensure a fairer comparison. Reachable sets are shown for those methods that are able to construct them. The published results are available on the website of the submission system[3] and in the repeatability repository[4].

4.1   CORA

For this year's iteration, we fine-tuned parameters for all benchmarks to strike a balance between required precision and computation time. An overview of the results are given in Tab. 1 and detailed below.

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[3]Submission system: https://arch.repeatability.cps.cit.tum.de
[4]Repeatability repository: https://gitlab.com/goranf/ARCH-COMP/-/tree/master/2025/AINNCS

Table 1: CORA. Overview of results: Verified (✓), falsified (✗), and unknown (?).

Benchmark	Instance	Result	Time [s]
Unicycle	reach	✓	8.077
ACC	safe-distance	✓	3.091
TORA	remain	✓	9.699
TORA	reach-tanh	✓	3.166
TORA	reach-sigmoid	✓	6.001
Single Pendulum	reach	✓	3.810
Double Pendulum	less-robust	?	4.231
Double Pendulum	more-robust	✗	5.224
Airplane	continuous	✗	2.713
VCAS	middle-19.5	✓	0.197
VCAS	middle-22.5	✓	0.130
VCAS	middle-25.5	✗	0.033
VCAS	middle-28.5	✗	0.034
VCAS	worst-19.5	✓	0.096
VCAS	worst-22.5	✗	0.061
VCAS	worst-25.5	✗	0.059
VCAS	worst-28.5	✗	0.043
Attitude Control	avoid	✓	3.418
QUAD	reach	✓	30.376
Docking	constraint	?	100.121
NAV	standard	✓	423.451
NAV	robust	✓	1.990
CartPole*	reach	✓	241.478

Figure 5: **CORA.** Computed reachable set and simulations of the ACC benchmark.

4.1.1   ACC

CORA is able to verify this benchmark. The computed reachable set as well as some simulations are visible in Fig. 5.

Figure 6: **CORA.** Computed reachable set and simulations of the TORA benchmark: ReLU controller (top), tanh controller (bottom left), and sigmoid controller (bottom right).

4.1.2 TORA

CORA is able to verify both the remain and the reach instance for all controllers of this benchmark. The computed reachable set as well as some simulations are visible in Fig. 6.

4.1.3 Unicycle

CORA is able to verify this benchmark. The computed reachable set as well as some simulations are visible in Fig. 7.

Figure 7: **CORA.** Computed reachable set and simulations of the unicycle benchmark.

4.1.4 VCAS

The VCAS benchmark has discrete time steps and multiple controllers, which is currently not supported by CORA. Thus, a custom algorithm was built for this benchmark. To deal with the discrete input set $\dot{h}_0(0) \in \{-19.5, -22.5, -25.5, -28.5\}$, we run the algorithm with each element of the input set individually. As proposed in the benchmark specifications, we show the results when always the middle acceleration of the controllers is chosen and the results when always the worst acceleration is chosen.

VCAS (middle acceleration)   Here we always use the middle of the possible accelerations. We are able to verify the benchmark for $\dot{h}_0(0) \in \{-19.5, -22.5\}$ and can show violations for $\dot{h}_0(0) \in \{-25.5, -28.5\}$. The computed reachable set along with some simulations are shown in Figure 8.

VCAS (worst acceleration)   Here we always use the worst possible acceleration.   We are able to verify the benchmark for $\dot{h}_0(0) \in \{-19.5\}$ and can show violations for $\dot{h}_0(0) \in \{-22.5, -25.5, -28.5\}$. The computed reachable set along with some simulations are shown in Figure 9.

4.1.5 Single Pendulum

CORA is able to verify this benchmark. The computed reachable set as well as some simulations are visible in Fig. 10.

4.1.6 Double Pendulum

CORA is able to falsify the instance using the more robust controller by providing a verified simulation run going outside the safe set, whereas the result for the less robust controllers remains unknown. The verified simulation run violating the specification is visible in Fig. 11.

Figure 8: **CORA.** Computed reachable set of the VCAS benchmark with middle acceleration.

Figure 9: **CORA.** Computed reachable set of the VCAS benchmark with worst acceleration.

4.1.7   Airplane

CORA is able to falsify this benchmark by providing a verified simulation run going outside the safe set. The verified simulation run violating the specification is visible in Fig. 12.

4.1.8   Attitude Control

CORA is able to verify this benchmark. The computed reachable set as well as some simulations are visible in Fig. 13.

Figure 10: **CORA.** Computed reachable set and simulations of the single pendulum benchmark.

Figure 11: **CORA.** Verified simulation run using the more robust controller violating the specification of the double pendulum benchmark.

4.1.9 Quadrotor

CORA is able to verify this benchmark. The computed reachable set as well as some simulations are visible in Fig. 14.

4.1.10 2D Spacecraft Docking

The spacecraft docking benchmark appeared difficult to verify for our approach. While the simulations seem to be stable, the reachable set explodes over time and thus we are unable to verify the benchmark. The computed reachable set along with some simulations are shown in Figure 15.

Figure 12: **CORA.** Verified simulation run violating the specification of the airplane benchmark.

Figure 13: **CORA.** Computed reachable set and simulations of the attitude control benchmark.

4.1.11   Navigation Task

CORA is able to verify both instances; however we want to notice that the robust controller is much easier to verify whereas the standard controller can only be verified using recursive splitting. The computed reachable set along with some simulations are shown in Figure 16.

4.1.12   CartPole

CORA is able to verify this benchmark for a smaller initial set, where each radius is set to 40% of its original length per dimension. The computed reachable set, along with some simulations, is shown in Figure 17.

Figure 14: **CORA.** Computed reachable set and simulations of the quadrotor benchmark.

Figure 15: **CORA.** Computed reachable set and simulations of the 2D spacecraft docking benchmark.

Figure 16: **CORA.** Computed reachable set and simulations of the navigation task benchmark: Standard controller (left) and robust controller (right).

Figure 17: **CORA.** Computed reachable set and simulations of the cartpole benchmark.

4.2 CROWN-Reach

This subsection presents the results of CROWN-Reach. Here we briefly introduce the specific setting for each benchmark. All the implementation and parameters can be found in the repeatability repository. An overview of the results is given in Tab. 2.

4.2.1 ACC

CROWN-Reach is able to verified this benchmark. The reachable sets of both "distance" D_{rel} and "safe distance" D_{safe} are shown in Fig. 18.

4.2.2 TORA

CROWN-Reach is able to verify all three instances of this benchmark. The computed reachable sets of the system are shown in Fig. 19. Note that for the instance under the ReLU controller (with specification 1), the initial set of x_1 and x_2 is uniformly divided into 4×3 subsets.

4.2.3 Unicycle

CROWN-Reach is able to verify this benchmark. The reachable sets are shown in Fig. 20.

Table 2: CROWN-Reach. Overview of results: Verified (✓), falsified (✗), and unknown (?).

Benchmark	Instance	Result	Time [s]
ACC	safe-distance	✓	2.525
Airplane	continues	✗	5.556
Attitude Control	avoid	✓	3.485
Single Pendulum	reach	✓	0.633
TORA	remain	✓	2.793
TORA	reach-sigmoid	✓	5.293
TORA	reach-tanh	✓	7.486
Unicycle	reach	✓	10.126
Balancing	reach	?	6.431
VCAS	worst-19.5	✓	0.339
VCAS	worst-22.5	✗	0.053
VCAS	worst-25.5	✗	0.031
VCAS	worst-28.5	✗	0.027
VCAS	middle-19.5	✓	0.274
VCAS	middle-22.5	✓	0.275
VCAS	middle-25.5	✗	0.057
VCAS	middle-28.5	✗	0.037
Double Pendulum	more-robust	✗	1.227
Double Pendulum	less-robust	✓	66.742
NAV	robust	✓	20.902
NAV	standard	✓	129.437
QUAD	reach	✓	3484.873

Figure 18: **CROWN-Reach.** Computed reachable sets of distance and safe distance in the following 5 seconds.


Figure 19: **CROWN-Reach.** Computed reachable sets of the TORA benchmark under the ReLU controller (top), the ReLU/tanh controller (bottom left), and the sigmoid controller (bottom right). All three instances are verified.

Figure 20: **CROWN-Reach.** Computed reachable sets of the Unicycle benchmark. The target set is proved to be reachable.


Figure 21: **CROWN-Reach.** Computed reachable sets (for verified instances) and simulation trajectories (for falsified instances) of the VCAS benchmark. The strategy for choosing acceleration is fixed to either "worst" (top) or "middle" (bottom). The initial value of $\dot{h}_0$ is chosen from $\{-19.5, -22.5, -25.5, -28.5\}$ (from left to right).

4.2.4 VerticalCAS

The VCAS benchmark has multiple controllers. To handle this benchmark, we treat the four possible inputs $\dot{h}_0(0) \in \{-19.5, -22.5, -25.5, -28.5\}$ separately and fix the acceleration selection strategies between "always choosing the middle one" and "always choosing the worst one". At each control step, CROWN-Reach bounds the outputs of the neural network controller and verifies that the advisory option is unique. To conclude, CROWN-Reach is able to show that when using the "worst" strategy, instances with $\dot{h}_0(0) = -19.5$ is verified. When using the "middle" strategy, instances with $\dot{h}_0(0) = -19.5$ or $\dot{h}_0(0) = -22.5$ are verified. All other instances are falsified by random simulation. The result visualizations are shown in Fig. 21.

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
Figure 22: **CROWN-Reach.** Computed reachable sets of the Single Pendulum benchmark.

Figure 23: **CROWN-Reach.** Result visualizations for the benchmark Double Pendulum, including the instance under the less robust controller (left) and the one under the more robust controller (right). For the falsified instance, we plot one counterexample trajectory. For the verified one, we show its reachable sets.

4.2.5 Single Pendulum

CROWN-Reach is able to verify this benchmark. The reachable sets are shown in Fig. 22.

4.2.6 Double Pendulum

CROWN-Reach is able to falsify the instance under the more robust controller by running a simulation starting from the initial point $(1.3, 1.3, 1.3, 1.3)$, and is able to verify the instance under the less robust controller by uniformly dividing the initial set into $5 \times 5 \times 3 \times 3$ subsets. The result visualizations are shown in Fig. 23.

Figure 24: **CROWN-Reach.** A trajectory from an initial point reaches out of the safe set, falsifying the Airplane benchmark.


Figure 25: **CROWN-Reach.** Computed reachable sets of the Attitude Control benchmark.

4.2.7   Airplane

CROWN-Reach is able to falsify this benchmark by showing that the trajectory starting from a counterexample initial state reach out of the safe set, as shown in Fig. 24.

4.2.8   Attitude Control

CROWN-Reach is able to verify this benchmark. The computed reachable sets are shown in Fig. 25.

4.2.9   Quadrotor

CROWN-Reach is able to verify this benchmark with input splits. The initial set is uniformly divided into $8 \times 8 \times 8 \times 2 \times 1 \times 1$ subsets and verified in parallel. The reachable sets are shown in Fig. 26.

Figure 26: **CROWN-Reach.** Computed reachable sets of the Quadrotor benchmark. Here for visualization, reachable sets are sampled on the dimension *time*.


Figure 27: **CROWN-Reach.** Computed reachable sets of the Navigation Task benchmark. Both the standard instance (left) and the robust one (right) are verified.

4.2.10 Navigation Task

CROWN-Reach is able to verify both instances of this benchmark with input splits. For the standard instance, the initial set is uniformly divided into $40 \times 16 \times 1 \times 1$ subsets and verified in parallel. For the robust instance, the initial set is uniformly divided into $5 \times 5 \times 1 \times 1$ subsets and verified in parallel. The reachable sets are shown in Fig. 27.

4.3 immrax

In order to accommodate our tool's capabilities, we interpreted the benchmarks in a slightly different manner. Namely, for the control system $\dot{x} = f(x, u)$, we assume the neural network is in continuous feedback, rather than with the sample-and-hold architecture pictured in Figure 1, meaning our closed loop system takes the form $\dot{x}(t) = f(x(t), \Phi(h(x(t)), v(t)))$.

Table 3: immrax. Overview of results: Verified (✓), falsified (✗), and unknown (?).

Benchmark	Instance	Result	Time [s]
ACC	safe-distance	✓	0.066
AttitudeControl	avoid	✗	0.507
NAV	robust	✓	42.384
SinglePendulum	reach	✗	0.005
TORA	reach-tanh	✓	0.020
TORA	reach-sigmoid	✓	0.023

Figure 28: *immrax*. The computed reachable sets of the relative distance and the safe distance are pictured. The benchmark is verified since there is no intersection of these sets.

4.3.1   ACC

We take the neural network to be in continuous feedback with the plant instead of with the sample-and-hold. We were able to verify the benchmark using the interconnection mode inclusion function from [35]. The results are shown in Figure 28.

4.3.2   Attitude Control

We take the neural network to be in continuous feedback with the plant instead of with the sample-and-hold. We were able to verify the benchmark using the H-polytope adjoint embedding system. The results are shown in Figure 29.

4.3.3   NAV

We take the neural network to be in continuous feedback with the plant instead of with the sample-and-hold. We were able to verify the robust neural network using the H-polytope adjoint embedding system, with the determinant control barrier function enabled with $\kappa = 0.1$, after partitioning the input set into $225 = 15 \times 15 \times 1 \times 1$ evenly spaced regions. The results are shown in Figure 30.

Figure 29: *immrax*. The reachable set for the attitude control system is shown.


Figure 30: *immrax*. The computed reachable set for the NAV benchmark with the robust controller is pictured.

4.3.4   Single Pendulum

When the neural network is taken in continuous feedback with the plant, the controller fails to satisfy the specification. Figure 31 shows a simulation from the upper corner of the initial set, which fails to enter the safe set within 0.5 seconds, as well as our computed reachable set using the H-polytope adjoint embedding system.

4.3.5   TORA

We take the neural network to be in continuous feedback with the plant instead of with the sample-and-hold. We were able to verify the reachability specifications with the tanh and sigmoid controllers using the H-polytope adjoint embedding system. The results are shown in Figure 32.

Figure 31: **immrax**. The reachable set for the single pendulum benchmark is shown. In continuous feedback, the controller fails to verify the specification, and a sample simulation from the upper corner of the initial set is shown to miss the safe set.


Figure 32: **immrax**. The computed reachable set for the TORA reachability benchmarks with the tanh (left) and sigmoid (right) controllers are pictured.

4.4 JuliaReach

This subsection presents the results of *JuliaReach*. For each problem, JuliaReach uses slightly different settings as described below. An overview of the results is given in Tab. 4.

4.4.1 ACC

Using the parameters `abstol=1e-3, orderT=5, orderQ=1`, JuliaReach verifies the specification in 0.6 s,. Figure 33 shows the reach sets of D_{rel} and D_{safe}.

Table 4: JuliaReach. Overview of results: Verified (✓), falsified (✗), and unknown (**?**).

Benchmark	Instance	Result	Time [s]
ACC	safe-distance	✓	0.638
TORA	remain	✓	232.083
TORA	reach-sigmoid	✓	0.458
TORA	reach-tanh	✓	0.357
Unicycle	reach	✓	16.341
VCAS	middle-19.5	✓	0.020
VCAS	middle-22.5	✓	0.001
VCAS	middle-25.5	✗	0.000
VCAS	middle-28.5	✗	0.000
Single Pendulum	reach	✓	11.126
Double Pendulum	less-robust	✓	2399.201
Double Pendulum	more-robust	✗	0.830
Airplane	continuous	✗	4.737
AttitudeControl	avoid	✓	5.728
QUAD	reach	?	11.392
Docking	constraint	?	4.459
NAV	robust	✓	5.197

Figure 33: **_JuliaReach._** Analysis results for the ACC benchmark. The plot additionally shows simulations.

4.4.2 TORA

The TORA benchmark problem has three different controllers. For the ReLU controller, the approximation error is hard to tame for the JuliaReach approach. To maintain enough precision for verification, the initial states are split into $4 \times 4 \times 3 \times 5$ boxes. While each box spawns an independent analysis that could be parallelized, the sequential verification took 232 s. We use the parameters `abstol=3e-2, orderT=3, orderQ=1`. Figure 34 shows the reach sets of all 240 runs, projected to x_1/x_2 and x_3/x_4, respectively.

For the sigmoid and ReLU/tanh controllers, we do not require to split the initial states and use the parameter `abstol=2e-2` instead. The specifications are verified in 0.5 s and 0.4 s, respectively. Figure 34 shows the reach sets, projected to x_1/x_2.

Figure 34: **JuliaReach.** Analysis results for the TORA benchmark under the ReLU controller (top), the sigmoid controller (bottom left), and the ReLU/tanh controller (bottom right), respectively. The plots additionally show simulations.


Figure 35: **JuliaReach.** Analysis results for the Unicycle benchmark. The orange subset of the last reach set is obtained at time point $t = 10$. The first plot additionally shows simulations.

Figure 36: **_JuliaReach._** Analysis results for the VerticalCAS benchmark.

4.4.3 Unicycle

We model the disturbance w as a constant with an uncertain initial value. Simulations show that the target set is reached only at the last moment, so the analysis requires high precision to prove containment of the last reach set. Using the parameters `abstol=1e-1, orderT=3, orderQ=1` and splitting the initial states into $3 \times 1 \times 7 \times 1$ boxes, JuliaReach verifies the specification in 16 s. Figure 35 shows the reach sets of all 21 runs, projected to x_1/x_2 and x_3/x_4, respectively. JuliaReach can evaluate the Taylor polynomial at the time point $t = 10$ (rather than the last time *interval*), which results in a more precise result (as shown in the plots).

4.4.4 VerticalCAS

The VerticalCAS benchmark problem differs from the other problems in that it uses multiple controllers and discrete time. There is currently no native support for this setting in JuliaReach; instead, we used a custom algorithm that always chooses the central acceleration. JuliaReach achieves the following results for the different initial values $\dot{h}(0)$. $\dot{h}(0) = -19.5$: verified in 0.02 s; $\dot{h}(0) = -22.5$: verified in 0.001 s; $\dot{h}(0) = -25.5$: falsified in 0.0004 s; $\dot{h}(0) = -28.5$: falsified in 0.0004 s; Figure 36 shows the vertical distances over time.

4.4.5 Single Pendulum

Using the parameters `abstol=1e-9, orderT=5, orderQ=1`, and splitting the initial states into 3×4 non-uniform boxes, JuliaReach verifies the specification in 11 s. Figure 37 shows the reach sets projected to time and θ.

4.4.6 Double Pendulum

For the less robust controller, using the parameters `abstol=1e-9, orderT=5, orderQ=1` and splitting the initial states into $2 \times 2 \times 3 \times 6$ boxes, JuliaReach verifies the specification in 40 minutes. Figure 38 shows the reach sets of all 72 runs, projected to θ_1/θ_2 resp. $\dot{\theta}_1/\dot{\theta}_2$.

The more robust controller violates the specification; hence, it suffices to start the analysis from a subset of the initial states and interrupt when a violation is detected. When starting from the highest value in each dimension, a violation occurs within eighteen control periods. Using the parameters `abstol=1e-2, orderT=3, orderQ=1`, JuliaReach falsifies the specification in 0.8 s. Figure 38 shows the simulation with a validated reach set around, projected to $\dot{\theta}_1/\dot{\theta}_2$.

Figure 37: *JuliaReach.* Analysis results for the Single Pendulum benchmark. The plot additionally shows simulations.


Figure 38: *JuliaReach.* Analysis results for the Double Pendulum benchmark under the less robust controller (top) and the more robust controller (bottom). The plots additionally show simulations.

4.4.7   Airplane

This system violates the specification. When starting from the highest coordinate in each dimension, a violation occurs within seven control periods in dimension s_y. Using the parameters `abstol=2e-2, orderT=3, orderQ=1`, JuliaReach falsifies the specification in 4.7 s. Figure 39 shows the simulation with a validated reach set around, projected to y/ϕ.

Figure 39: **_JuliaReach._** Analysis results for the Airplane benchmark until time $t = 0.7$. The plot additionally shows a simulation.


Figure 40: **_JuliaReach._** Analysis results for the Attitude Control benchmark. The plot additionally shows simulations.

4.4.8 Attitude Control

Using the parameters `abstol=1e-4, orderT=5, orderQ=1`, JuliaReach verifies the specification in 5.7 s. Figure 40 shows the reach sets projected to ω_1/ω_2.

4.4.9 Quadrotor

Although simulations indicate that the controller is correct, the precision of JuliaReach is not high enough to prove it. Correctness can be proven for a smaller initial set $[-0.004, 0.004]^6 \times \{0\}^6$. Using the parameters `abstol=1e-1, orderT=3, orderQ=1`, JuliaReach verifies the specification in 11 s. Figure 41 shows the reach sets, projected to x_3 over time.

4.4.10 2D Spacecraft Docking

Although simulations indicate that the controller is correct, the precision of JuliaReach is not high enough to prove it. Correctness can be proven for a smaller initial set $[70, 106]^2 \times [-0.14, 0.14]^2$. Using the parameters `abstol=5e-1, orderT=3, orderQ=1`, JuliaReach verifies the specification in 4 s. Figure 42 shows the reach sets, projected to x_1 over time. Since the specification is four-dimensional, it cannot be illustrated in the plot.

Figure 41: **JuliaReach.** Analysis results for the Quadrotor benchmark. The plot additionally shows a simulation.


Figure 42: **JuliaReach.** Analysis results for the 2D Spacecraft Docking benchmark. The plot additionally shows simulations.

4.4.11   NAV

JuliaReach cannot verify the standard controller. For the robust controller, using the parameters `abstol=1e-3, orderT=3, orderQ=1`, JuliaReach verifies the specification in 5 s. Figure 43 shows the reach sets projected to x_1/x_2.

Figure 43: **JuliaReach.** Analysis results for the NAV benchmark (robust controller). The plot additionally shows simulations.

4.5 NNV

This subsection presents the results of *NNV*. For each problem, NNV uses slightly different settings, which can be found in the repeatability repository. An overview of the results is given in Tab. 5. All other benchmarks were unknown due to the conservativeness of the approach.

4.5.1 ACC

NNV successfully verifies the safety property $D_{\mathrm{rel}} \geq D_{\mathrm{safe}}$. The results are depicted in Figure 44, which shows the reach sets of the relative distance and the minimum safety distance between the ego and lead cars.

Table 5: NNV. Overview of results: Verified (✔), falsified (✗), and unknown (?).

| Benchmark	Instance	Result	Time [s]
ACC	safety	✔	26.751
Airplane	continuous	✗	35.961
NAV	robust	✔	405.291
Single Pendulum	reach	✔	99.484
TORA	remain	✔	25.038
TORA	reach-tanh	✔	63.521
TORA	reach-sigmoid	✔	118.312
VCAS	middle19	✔	5.445
VCAS	middle22	✔	3.619
VCAS	middle25	✗	3.592
VCAS	middle28	✗	3.603
VCAS	worst19	✔	3.618
VCAS	worst22	✗	3.502
VCAS	worst25	✗	3.462
VCAS	worst28	✗	3.387

Figure 44: **NNV.** Safety analysis results for the adaptive cruise control (ACC) benchmark. Distance between cars ($D_{\mathbf{rel}}$) is depicted against the safety distance ($D_{\mathbf{safe}}$).

4.5.2 Airplane

NNV is able to show that the property is violated by computing the reach sets from a smaller initial region. The results are depicted in Figure 45.


Figure 45: **NNV.** Analysis results for the airplane benchmark, showing the reach sets in **blue** and the goal region in **green**.

4.5.3 NAV

By partitioning the input set, NNV is able to verify the safety (avoid obstacle) and reach (green goal region) properties of the robust controller, but not of the standard one. The results are depicted in Figure 46.

4.5.4 Single Pendulum

For the single pendulum, NNV successfully verifies the benchmark after partitioning the input set into $35{\times}40$ regions. The reach sets are depicted in Figure 47.

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
Figure 46: *NNV.* Verification results of the navigation benchmark with the robust controller. In blue are shown the reachable sets, in green the target regions (reach) and in red the unsafe (obstacle) area.

Figure 47: **NNV.** Analysis results for the single pendulum benchmark showing the sets in **blue** and the unsafe region in **red**.

4.5.5   TORA

NNV is able to verify all three controllers for the TORA benchmark. NNV partitions the initial sets of the specifications corresponding to the ReLU-tanh and sigmoid controllers into 4×8×6×4, and 4×4×6×4, respectively. The reach sets are shown in Figure 48.

4.5.6   VCAS

NNV successfully verifies the NMAC safety property for the whole time horizon for each of the cases. There are 5 cases where we prove that the system is unsafe and 3 where the system is safe, which corresponds to [middle, 19.5], [middle, 22.5], and [worst, 19.5]. These results are depicted in Figures 49 and 50.

Figure 48: **NNV.** Analysis results for the Tora benchmark showing the TORA sets in blue and the goal region in green. The left figures correspond to the sigmoid controller, the middle two to the ReLU-tanh controller, and the two on the right to the ReLU controller. For the *sigmoid* and *ReLU-tanh* controllers only the reach sets at every control period are shown in the top row. The corresponding zoomed-in pictures of the goal region are depicted in the bottom row.

Figure 49: **NNV.** Analysis results for the VerticalCAS benchmark, showing the aircraft sets in blue and the unsafe region in red, when selecting the middle acceleration value at each control period


Figure 50: **NNV.** Analysis results for the VerticalCAS benchmark, showing the aircraft sets in blue and the unsafe region in red, when selecting the worst possible acceleration value at each control period.

5   Category Status and Challenges

Repeatability Evaluation.   For the third year in a row, this competition presents the results of all tools on the same hardware using docker images for further comparison, using the platform introduced in the 2023 competition. The docker images allow an automatic evaluation of the tools on the submission server, thus, giving researchers immediate feedback on the results of their submission. Running all tools on the same hardware helps to compare the computation time between the tools, however, one has to factor in the efficiency of the programming language of the tools. We can objectively compare computation results and evaluate the improvements made by the tools in this aspect. The submission server specifications are given in Appendix A. Additionally, this year the submission server provides a beta feature for automated figure conversion for easier integration with LaTeX for presenting the results.

YoY performance comparison.   As we have reused all 12 benchmarks from last year and the hardware platform is the same as well, we can directly compared 2025 vs. 2024 results. From the previous tool participants, we can observe very similar results, only one more benchmarks instance is verified (CORA), while there has been some efficiency improvements in terms of computation time from both CORA and NNV.

NNCS verification problem abstractions.   Following last year's including of a statistical verification approach, this year the report includes the results of a tool, immrax, that abstracts the NNCS verification problem to be a continuous-feedback problem, rather than a hold and sample control approach (see Figure 1) utilize by all other participants (in this and all past iterations). Given the verification problem is different, it may lead to different results (verified vs. violated), as we can observe for the single pendulum and attitude control benchmarks, where all other tools that solve the problem are able to successfully verify them, but immrax is able to find counterexamples that violate the specifications.

Challenging benchmarks.   The neural network architectures presented in this work are fairly simple. As last year, they have no more than a thousand neurons and no more than 5 hidden layers in their architecture, unlike some of the networks that can be analyzed in isolation. Also, the maximum number of inputs and outputs of the controllers are 12 and 6, respectively, both in the airplane benchmark. Considering the VCAS benchmark, these networks have 9 outputs, although these are translated into a single input to the plant model. However, for some benchmarks, there are still state-space explosion and scalability issues to address in both the neural network controllers and plant analysis. These issues could come from the repeated interaction between the network and the states, as we can observe the CartPole benchmark being challenging for most tools. The high frequency of the control steps may lead to an increased conservativeness of the approaches, preventing most tools from successfully analyzing the benchmark. Another challenging benchmark is the docking spacecraft, which is due to the nonlinear specification, one of a kind in this competition. While the plant dynamics and controller are on the "simpler" side, the nonlinear safety specification causes the benchmark to remain unsolved one more year.

Benchmark formats. Following previous iterations, we have found it more useful and convenient to simply share the plant models in a plain format, such as MATLAB functions, where the participants could easily extract the ODEs. As for the neural network models, we provide them in the ONNX format[56], .mat format[7], and the original format used by the proposer of the benchmark. In the future, we will consider other options to improve specification description for benchmarks, as a plain text file is now being used. The creation of a standard format like VNNLIB [8] for AINNCS may help formalize the benchmarks, clearly specifying the input set as well as the AINNCS property (safety, reach, avoid, etc), hopefully lowering the entry barrier for new tools. Another format to consider is to use a unified file that specifies the feedback connection between the controller and plant, control period, specification, etc, for improve automation of benchmark execution.

6 Conclusion and Outlook

This report presents the results of the seventh ARCH friendly competition for closed-loop systems with neural network controllers. For this edition, five tools have participated and attempted to solve 12 benchmarks: CORA, CROWN-Reach, immrax, JuliaReach, and NNV. The problems elucidated in this paper are challenging and diverse; the presented results probably provide the most complete assessment of current tools for the safety verification in AINNCS. The report provides a good overview of the intellectual progression of this rapidly growing field, and it is our hope to stimulate the development of efficient and effective methods capable of use in real-world applications. Since its inception, the complexity of the benchmarks has consistently increased along with the capabilities of the participant tools, leading to the most challenging competition and the best verification results thus far, which is a good indicator for this growing and maturing field. For this year, we reused the same 12 benchmarks from last year as there are some that remain unsolved to this date. Finally, as we continue to reuse and build upon previous participations, we encourage anyone interested to begin analyzing the benchmarks presented in this iteration, available at: https://github.com/verivital/ARCH-COMP2025. The reports of other categories can be found in the proceedings and on the ARCH website: cps-vo.org/group/ARCH. We hope releasing all the code would help other researchers and tools participate in future iterations as well as compare to the state-of-the-art verification tools in the domain.

7 Acknowledgments

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[5]Open Neural Network Exchange: https://github.com/onnx/onnx
[6]Except for TORA with sigmoid and tanh controller
[7]Direct input format used by *NNV* without transformation.
[8]http://www.vnnlib.org/

A   Specification of Used Machines

This year, we run all tools on the same hardware using tool-specific Docker images. The specifications for the server used for the evaluation are given below. For details on the submission system, we refer to the repeatability report of this year's ARCH competition [46].

- Processor: AMD EPYC 7742 64-Core

- Memory: 995 GB

- OS: Ubuntu 22.04

- Docker: 20.10.21

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